Negotiation Research: Looking for a Favor? Ask in Person

Imagine that you are about to ask someone for something. Maybe you’re trying to initiate a negotiation by asking a potential customer to listen to your proposal. Or you could be making a one-off request, such as asking a neighbor to quiet his barking dog. How likely do you think it is that the other party will comply with your request?

In fact, the odds someone will comply with our requests when we approach them in person are much better than we tend to believe. Considerable recent research demonstrates that we greatly underestimate the likelihood that others will say yes to our “asks.” Why? Because we fail to adequately take our counterpart’s perspective. Specifically, we don’t imagine how potentially awkward and uncomfortable it might be for someone to say no right to our face, and how bad it might make him feel to let us down.

If we underestimate the success of our face-to-face persuasion efforts, what about the requests we frequently make via email—for a charitable donation, a meeting with a potential mentor, and so on? How likely do we think our email requests are to succeed, and how accurate are our perceptions?

To answer these questions, researchers M. Mahdi Roghanizad of Western University in Ontario and Vanessa K. Bohns of Cornell University had hundreds of university students approach strangers either in person or via email and make a request. In one of the experiments, for example, each student was assigned to ask 10 strangers either on campus or via email to complete a 44-item personality test for no reward. When asked to predict in advance how many of the 10 people they approached or emailed would comply with this request, the students in both conditions predicted that about half of them would. As in past studies, this was an underestimation for in-person requests; about 7 out of 10 people they approached in person complied, on average. But for emailed requests, this was a vast overestimation: Most requesters did not get even one response from their 10 requests. The researchers found similar evidence of overestimation of email responses to requests in a second experiment.

The implications of the findings are clear: Although it’s easy and more comfortable to ask for favors via email, it’s even easier for targets to press delete. We are far more likely to get their attention and compliance if we seek them out in person.

Resource: “Ask in Person: You’re Less Persuasive Than You Think over Email,” by M. Mahdi Roghanizad and Vanessa K. Bohns, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2017.

Negotiation Research: Looking for a Favor? Ask in Person

Imagine that you are about to ask someone for something. Maybe you’re trying to initiate a negotiation by asking a potential customer to listen to your proposal. Or you could be making a one-off request, such as asking a neighbor to quiet his barking dog. How likely do you think it is that the other party will comply with your request?

In fact, the odds someone will comply with our requests when we approach them in person are much better than we tend to believe. Considerable recent research demonstrates that we greatly underestimate the likelihood that others will say yes to our “asks.” Why? Because we fail to adequately take our counterpart’s perspective. Specifically, we don’t imagine how potentially awkward and uncomfortable it might be for someone to say no right to our face, and how bad it might make him feel to let us down.

If we underestimate the success of our face-to-face persuasion efforts, what about the requests we frequently make via email—for a charitable donation, a meeting with a potential mentor, and so on? How likely do we think our email requests are to succeed, and how accurate are our perceptions?

To answer these questions, researchers M. Mahdi Roghanizad of Western University in Ontario and Vanessa K. Bohns of Cornell University had hundreds of university students approach strangers either in person or via email and make a request. In one of the experiments, for example, each student was assigned to ask 10 strangers either on campus or via email to complete a 44-item personality test for no reward. When asked to predict in advance how many of the 10 people they approached or emailed would comply with this request, the students in both conditions predicted that about half of them would. As in past studies, this was an underestimation for in-person requests; about 7 out of 10 people they approached in person complied, on average. But for emailed requests, this was a vast overestimation: Most requesters did not get even one response from their 10 requests. The researchers found similar evidence of overestimation of email responses to requests in a second experiment.

The implications of the findings are clear: Although it’s easy and more comfortable to ask for favors via email, it’s even easier for targets to press delete. We are far more likely to get their attention and compliance if we seek them out in person.

Resource: “Ask in Person: You’re Less Persuasive Than You Think over Email,” by M. Mahdi Roghanizad and Vanessa K. Bohns, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2017.

When Forming First Offers, Take Precision into Account

Tailor the precision of your opening offer to your counterpart’s expertise.

What should your first offer be in a negotiation?

The question doubtless has led to sleepless nights for negotiators who understand that the first offer in a negotiation tends to have a strong anchoring effect on the haggling that may follow. Because even extreme offers can pull the discussion in their direction, the question of how high or low an opening offer to make is a critical one.

In addition to an offer’s size, its precision can have an anchoring effect as well. Specifically, all 49 studies on the topic have found that the more precise a number is, the stronger its anchoring effect will be, write Professor David D. Loschelder of Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Germany, and his colleagues in a new study. For example, a house with a precise listing price, such as $355,500, is likely to generate higher bids from potential buyers than a house with a less precise listing price, such as $356,000 or $354,000.

People tend to express offers as round numbers in negotiation, and they may be unaware of the potential anchoring benefits of more precise offers found in past research. On the online real estate site Zillow, for example, only 2% of sellers’ listing prices were specified to
the dollar place (such as $456,235), Professor Malia F. Mason of Columbia University and her colleagues found in
a 2013 study.

People may be unaware of the potential anchoring benefits of more precise anchors.

But consider that almost all of the 49 studies demonstrating the superior anchoring effects of precise offers were conducted with amateur negotiators—people with no or little insider knowledge about appropriate pricing in the industry they were being asked about. When negotiating in their field, are experts swayed by precise anchors in the same manner as amateurs? Given that we often negotiate with experts, such as real estate agents and car salespeople, it’s an important question to ask and one that Loschelder and his colleagues examined in their new study.

Amateurs and experts

In their research, Loschelder and his team compared how amateurs and experts in different contexts reacted to opening offers of varying precision.

In one online experiment, for example, the participants were 230 individuals who lacked professional negotiation experience and worked outside the field of real estate (the “amateurs”) and 223 real estate agents who had worked in the field for an average of about 17 years and negotiated the sale of 20 houses, on average, per year (the “experts”).

The amateurs and the experts were individually presented with a detailed real estate listing for a house. They were also given the home’s listing price, which varied across participants in its degree of precision, ranging from the imprecise (€980,000) to the extremely precise (€978,781.63 or €981,218.37, figures below and above the imprecise listing price). Then the participants were asked to make a counteroffer to the seller and to state the highest price they were willing to pay for the house.

As in past studies, the more precise the offer they saw, the more the amateurs were willing to pay and the higher their counteroffer was. By contrast, an offer’s precision anchored the experts only up to a point. Once an offer was so precise that it included cents (for example, €978,218.30), their willingness to pay and counteroffers began to drop. Similarly, in a follow-up experiment, real estate agents made significantly higher counteroffers when presented with a moderately precise offer for a chemical plant (€25,750,000) than when given a highly precise offer for the plant (€25,748,637).

In other experiments, the researchers found that the strategy of making very precise offers also backfired when car salespeople and human-resource professionals were preparing to negotiate in their field of expertise. However, when a seller gave a specific reason to explain the precision of an offer—for example, “correcting” an expert appraisal of a used car with additional information on the car’s value—the experts were once again anchored by precision and forfeited value to the seller.

Tempering your precision

Why were amateurs more susceptible than experts to being anchored by precise offers? Amateurs tended to view an offer’s precision as a sign that the price setter was confident and competent. By contrast, because of their experience and knowledge, experts did not make these competence inferences unless the seller explicitly justified the precision.

Overall, the results suggest that when dealing with someone who is a relative amateur in the negotiating context, you may gain an edge by making a precise first offer. However, when negotiating with experts, you would be wise to round up your offer unless you have a strong explanation for why it is precise.

Source: “The Too-Much-Precision Effect: When and Why Precise Anchors Backfire with Experts,” by David D. Loschelder, Malte Friese, Michael Schaerer, and Adam D. Galinsky, Psychological Science, 2016.

When Forming First Offers, Take Precision into Account

Tailor the precision of your opening offer to your counterpart’s expertise.

What should your first offer be in a negotiation?

The question doubtless has led to sleepless nights for negotiators who understand that the first offer in a negotiation tends to have a strong anchoring effect on the haggling that may follow. Because even extreme offers can pull the discussion in their direction, the question of how high or low an opening offer to make is a critical one.

In addition to an offer’s size, its precision can have an anchoring effect as well. Specifically, all 49 studies on the topic have found that the more precise a number is, the stronger its anchoring effect will be, write Professor David D. Loschelder of Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Germany, and his colleagues in a new study. For example, a house with a precise listing price, such as $355,500, is likely to generate higher bids from potential buyers than a house with a less precise listing price, such as $356,000 or $354,000.

People tend to express offers as round numbers in negotiation, and they may be unaware of the potential anchoring benefits of more precise offers found in past research. On the online real estate site Zillow, for example, only 2% of sellers’ listing prices were specified to
the dollar place (such as $456,235), Professor Malia F. Mason of Columbia University and her colleagues found in
a 2013 study.

People may be unaware of the potential anchoring benefits of more precise anchors.

But consider that almost all of the 49 studies demonstrating the superior anchoring effects of precise offers were conducted with amateur negotiators—people with no or little insider knowledge about appropriate pricing in the industry they were being asked about. When negotiating in their field, are experts swayed by precise anchors in the same manner as amateurs? Given that we often negotiate with experts, such as real estate agents and car salespeople, it’s an important question to ask and one that Loschelder and his colleagues examined in their new study.

Amateurs and experts

In their research, Loschelder and his team compared how amateurs and experts in different contexts reacted to opening offers of varying precision.

In one online experiment, for example, the participants were 230 individuals who lacked professional negotiation experience and worked outside the field of real estate (the “amateurs”) and 223 real estate agents who had worked in the field for an average of about 17 years and negotiated the sale of 20 houses, on average, per year (the “experts”).

The amateurs and the experts were individually presented with a detailed real estate listing for a house. They were also given the home’s listing price, which varied across participants in its degree of precision, ranging from the imprecise (€980,000) to the extremely precise (€978,781.63 or €981,218.37, figures below and above the imprecise listing price). Then the participants were asked to make a counteroffer to the seller and to state the highest price they were willing to pay for the house.

As in past studies, the more precise the offer they saw, the more the amateurs were willing to pay and the higher their counteroffer was. By contrast, an offer’s precision anchored the experts only up to a point. Once an offer was so precise that it included cents (for example, €978,218.30), their willingness to pay and counteroffers began to drop. Similarly, in a follow-up experiment, real estate agents made significantly higher counteroffers when presented with a moderately precise offer for a chemical plant (€25,750,000) than when given a highly precise offer for the plant (€25,748,637).

In other experiments, the researchers found that the strategy of making very precise offers also backfired when car salespeople and human-resource professionals were preparing to negotiate in their field of expertise. However, when a seller gave a specific reason to explain the precision of an offer—for example, “correcting” an expert appraisal of a used car with additional information on the car’s value—the experts were once again anchored by precision and forfeited value to the seller.

Tempering your precision

Why were amateurs more susceptible than experts to being anchored by precise offers? Amateurs tended to view an offer’s precision as a sign that the price setter was confident and competent. By contrast, because of their experience and knowledge, experts did not make these competence inferences unless the seller explicitly justified the precision.

Overall, the results suggest that when dealing with someone who is a relative amateur in the negotiating context, you may gain an edge by making a precise first offer. However, when negotiating with experts, you would be wise to round up your offer unless you have a strong explanation for why it is precise.

Source: “The Too-Much-Precision Effect: When and Why Precise Anchors Backfire with Experts,” by David D. Loschelder, Malte Friese, Michael Schaerer, and Adam D. Galinsky, Psychological Science, 2016.

Switching Channels: How Fox Star Megyn Kelly Ended up at NBC

In the summer of 2016, it seemed the approaching end of television journalist Megyn Kelly’s contract with Fox News in mid-2017 couldn’t have been better timed for her. The host of the daily evening news program The Kelly File on Fox, she had seen her profile rise over the past year, beginning with her pointed questioning of Donald J. Trump at the first Republican presidential debate in August 2015. Kelly would later characterize Trump’s coarse post-debate criticism and lingering fixation on her as unnerving, but the drama boosted her stature as a bold, tough reporter, and ratings for her Fox show rose steadily.

James and Lachlan Murdoch, top 21st Century Fox executives and sons of the company’s CEO, Rupert Murdoch, were determined to convince Kelly to renew her contract. In July, the brothers reportedly expedited the departure of Fox News chairman and CEO Roger Ailes from the network after Fox anchor Gretchen Carlson abruptly quit and sued him for sexual harassment. Anticipating that Hillary Clinton would be the next president, the younger Murdochs were said to want to steer Fox in a more moderate direction. The brothers offered Kelly their support in her feud with Trump and discussed their desire to make her their “proxy” at the network, according to Newsweek.

Tuning out?

Having said that she would like to host a long-form interview show that would allow her to spend more time with her family, Kelly began meeting with other networks to consider her options.

Anticipating a frenzied bidding war, the Murdoch brothers reportedly offered to boost her salary from $10–$12 million per year to about $20 million per year, on a par with the earnings of Fox’s

most successful host, Bill O’Reilly. The brothers asked Kelly to make a decision about contract renewal before launching her memoir, Settle for More, in November. But with her star power burning ever brighter in the lead-up to the election, Kelly extended her job search.

After Trump’s upset victory, which other Fox News hosts met with glee, Kelly seemed to become more serious about moving on to another network. According to Newsweek, Kelly had become isolated at Fox, in part because staffers felt her revelation in her book that Ailes had sexually harassed her as well had been disloyal. It was becoming evident that Kelly was in no position to be the leader at Fox that the Murdoch brothers had planned.

A new beginning

The anticipated auction for Kelly never materialized. The two front-runners in the race, CNN and ABC, each decided to bow out. ABC may have lost interest in poaching Kelly from Fox after her heavily promoted prime-time interview with Trump was a critical and ratings disappointment, according to Vanity Fair.

In the end, it was NBC News, which had flown under the radar throughout much of Kelly’s search, that captured her attention. Unlike other networks, which offered preconceived notions of how she would fit into their schedules, NBC “came to her with a blank slate and asked her what she would like to do . . . and then delivered it,” a source close to Kelly told Vanity Fair. NBC News chairman Andrew Lack offered Kelly a daytime show that would allow her to have dinner with her family every day, as well as a Sunday news-magazine show.

On January 3, Kelly informed Lachlan Murdoch that she would be leaving Fox for NBC. She is believed to have accepted a salary that is slightly lower than what the Murdochs ultimately offered for the chance to increase her time with her family and take creative risks. And risks they are: The daytime talk shows of established news personalities such as Katie Couric, Anderson Cooper, and Meredith Vieira have all flopped in recent years.

Job negotiation tips from the Kelly files:

Get the timing right. Kelly carried out job negotiations at a snail’s pace to drum up maximum interest, but be careful not to let your negotiations run on so long that counterparts lose interest.

Listen to learn. To win over top job candidates, start off by asking them what they’re looking for rather than telling them how they would fit in.

Anticipate shifting tides. Because no one has a crystal ball, prepare contingencies in the event that unforeseen circumstances derail your carefully laid plans.

Switching Channels: How Fox Star Megyn Kelly Ended up at NBC

In the summer of 2016, it seemed the approaching end of television journalist Megyn Kelly’s contract with Fox News in mid-2017 couldn’t have been better timed for her. The host of the daily evening news program The Kelly File on Fox, she had seen her profile rise over the past year, beginning with her pointed questioning of Donald J. Trump at the first Republican presidential debate in August 2015. Kelly would later characterize Trump’s coarse post-debate criticism and lingering fixation on her as unnerving, but the drama boosted her stature as a bold, tough reporter, and ratings for her Fox show rose steadily.

James and Lachlan Murdoch, top 21st Century Fox executives and sons of the company’s CEO, Rupert Murdoch, were determined to convince Kelly to renew her contract. In July, the brothers reportedly expedited the departure of Fox News chairman and CEO Roger Ailes from the network after Fox anchor Gretchen Carlson abruptly quit and sued him for sexual harassment. Anticipating that Hillary Clinton would be the next president, the younger Murdochs were said to want to steer Fox in a more moderate direction. The brothers offered Kelly their support in her feud with Trump and discussed their desire to make her their “proxy” at the network, according to Newsweek.

Tuning out?

Having said that she would like to host a long-form interview show that would allow her to spend more time with her family, Kelly began meeting with other networks to consider her options.

Anticipating a frenzied bidding war, the Murdoch brothers reportedly offered to boost her salary from $10–$12 million per year to about $20 million per year, on a par with the earnings of Fox’s

most successful host, Bill O’Reilly. The brothers asked Kelly to make a decision about contract renewal before launching her memoir, Settle for More, in November. But with her star power burning ever brighter in the lead-up to the election, Kelly extended her job search.

After Trump’s upset victory, which other Fox News hosts met with glee, Kelly seemed to become more serious about moving on to another network. According to Newsweek, Kelly had become isolated at Fox, in part because staffers felt her revelation in her book that Ailes had sexually harassed her as well had been disloyal. It was becoming evident that Kelly was in no position to be the leader at Fox that the Murdoch brothers had planned.

A new beginning

The anticipated auction for Kelly never materialized. The two front-runners in the race, CNN and ABC, each decided to bow out. ABC may have lost interest in poaching Kelly from Fox after her heavily promoted prime-time interview with Trump was a critical and ratings disappointment, according to Vanity Fair.

In the end, it was NBC News, which had flown under the radar throughout much of Kelly’s search, that captured her attention. Unlike other networks, which offered preconceived notions of how she would fit into their schedules, NBC “came to her with a blank slate and asked her what she would like to do . . . and then delivered it,” a source close to Kelly told Vanity Fair. NBC News chairman Andrew Lack offered Kelly a daytime show that would allow her to have dinner with her family every day, as well as a Sunday news-magazine show.

On January 3, Kelly informed Lachlan Murdoch that she would be leaving Fox for NBC. She is believed to have accepted a salary that is slightly lower than what the Murdochs ultimately offered for the chance to increase her time with her family and take creative risks. And risks they are: The daytime talk shows of established news personalities such as Katie Couric, Anderson Cooper, and Meredith Vieira have all flopped in recent years.

Job negotiation tips from the Kelly files:

Get the timing right. Kelly carried out job negotiations at a snail’s pace to drum up maximum interest, but be careful not to let your negotiations run on so long that counterparts lose interest.

Listen to learn. To win over top job candidates, start off by asking them what they’re looking for rather than telling them how they would fit in.

Anticipate shifting tides. Because no one has a crystal ball, prepare contingencies in the event that unforeseen circumstances derail your carefully laid plans.

When Negotiators Strive to Appear Unpredictable

The costs and risks of Richard Nixon’s “madman theory” of negotiation.

During the height of the Vietnam War, U.S. president Richard Nixon confided in his chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, that he had devised a special strategy to end the war: He was trying to convince his Communist Bloc enemies, the Soviet Union and the North Vietnamese, that he was insane. In his book The Ends of Power, Haldeman recalled Nixon saying:

I call it the Madman Theory. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that, “For God’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed with Communism. We can’t restrain him when he’s angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button!” And Ho Chi Min himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.

In October 1969, Nixon tested his madman theory by putting the U.S. military on full global war–readiness alert, including having bombers armed with thermonuclear weapons buzz the Soviet border for several days. Nixon had no intention of attacking the Soviet Union
but wanted to send the message that he was out of control and willing to drop bombs to end the Vietnam War. The Soviets ignored the provocations.

Later, the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, left a meeting with Nixon convinced that he was “unhinged,” Nicole Hemmer writes in an article for Vox.com. But Nixon’s displays of madness remained ineffective at inducing compliance from the communists. It was another four years before the Vietnam War ended. Nixon’s foreign-policy successes came from more rational policies, such as triangulation and détente, than from displays of alarming behavior, notes Hemmer.

Surprise moves from a president-elect

As Donald J. Trump takes office, some observers believe he has adopted Nixon’s madman theory on foreign policy, or a version of it centered on appearing unpredictable. During the presidential campaign, Trump—a longtime admirer of Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s national security adviser and secretary of state—repeatedly expressed his view that the United States needed to capitalize on the element of surprise when dealing with other nations. “You want to be unpredictable,” he said on the TV show Face the Nation when asked about his position on nuclear weapons. And when asked about China’s aggressive moves in the South China Sea, Trump refused to say how he would respond as president: “I wouldn’t want them to know what my real thinking is.”

As president-elect, Trump made a series of moves that gave the impression he was, indeed, bent on appearing unpredictable and downright provocative. He angered China repeatedly with his actions and statements, beginning with his protocol-breaking phone call with the president of Taiwan. He disparaged NATO, the United Nations, the European Union, and German chancellor Angela Merkel in interviews and Twitter messages. And on Twitter, he wrote that he believed the United States should start stockpiling nuclear weapons again—a position all the more surprising given his admiring comments about Russian president Vladimir Putin and expressed desire to build better relations with Russia. “Mr. Trump’s unpredictability is perhaps his most predictable characteristic,” the New York Times concluded a few days before his inauguration.

Should we cultivate unpredictability?

We don’t know whether Trump’s unpredictable moves in the realm of foreign policy are impulsive or deliberately aimed at disarming his perceived adversaries. But the renewed discussion of the madman theory in the media and Trump’s provocative moves raise the question of whether calculated unpredictability is a winning strategy in negotiation.

In a 2013 study led by Professor Marwan Sinaceur of INSEAD in France, participants made greater concessions to counterparts who varied their emotional expressions over the course of a negotiation simulation—from cooperation to anger, for example—than to partners who seemed more emotionally consistent. The researchers concluded that trying to appear unpredictable can be an effective strategy in one-shot or short-term negotiations, particularly when you don’t expect to do business with that person again. Intimidating and even frightening displays can, indeed, motivate others to back down and give you what you want.

Yet for many negotiators, displaying false emotions or giving an inaccurate impression of their mental state, like other forms of deception, would violate their personal code of ethics. Moreover, unpredictability is likely to backfire in long-term negotiations and partnerships for several reasons. First, your efforts to repeatedly catch your counterpart off-guard could leave her feeling so irritated by your games that she retaliates or replaces you with a more consistent counterpart. Second, your reputation for unpredictability could spread throughout your network and leave you lacking desirable negotiating partners. Third, if people feel threatened by your outrageous claims or behavior, they could reciprocate with unstable and potentially damaging behavior of their own.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, unpredictability is a very narrow tool that requires us to sacrifice a much broader array of strategies that form the bedrock of effective mutual-gains negotiation, including trust building, information sharing, and joint value creation. Any short-term benefits a negotiator might gain from surprise and intimidation are likely to eventually be dwarfed by the long-term costs of alienating partners and walling oneself off from more collaborative approaches.

When Negotiators Strive to Appear Unpredictable

The costs and risks of Richard Nixon’s “madman theory” of negotiation.

During the height of the Vietnam War, U.S. president Richard Nixon confided in his chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, that he had devised a special strategy to end the war: He was trying to convince his Communist Bloc enemies, the Soviet Union and the North Vietnamese, that he was insane. In his book The Ends of Power, Haldeman recalled Nixon saying:

I call it the Madman Theory. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that, “For God’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed with Communism. We can’t restrain him when he’s angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button!” And Ho Chi Min himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.

In October 1969, Nixon tested his madman theory by putting the U.S. military on full global war–readiness alert, including having bombers armed with thermonuclear weapons buzz the Soviet border for several days. Nixon had no intention of attacking the Soviet Union
but wanted to send the message that he was out of control and willing to drop bombs to end the Vietnam War. The Soviets ignored the provocations.

Later, the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, left a meeting with Nixon convinced that he was “unhinged,” Nicole Hemmer writes in an article for Vox.com. But Nixon’s displays of madness remained ineffective at inducing compliance from the communists. It was another four years before the Vietnam War ended. Nixon’s foreign-policy successes came from more rational policies, such as triangulation and détente, than from displays of alarming behavior, notes Hemmer.

Surprise moves from a president-elect

As Donald J. Trump takes office, some observers believe he has adopted Nixon’s madman theory on foreign policy, or a version of it centered on appearing unpredictable. During the presidential campaign, Trump—a longtime admirer of Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s national security adviser and secretary of state—repeatedly expressed his view that the United States needed to capitalize on the element of surprise when dealing with other nations. “You want to be unpredictable,” he said on the TV show Face the Nation when asked about his position on nuclear weapons. And when asked about China’s aggressive moves in the South China Sea, Trump refused to say how he would respond as president: “I wouldn’t want them to know what my real thinking is.”

As president-elect, Trump made a series of moves that gave the impression he was, indeed, bent on appearing unpredictable and downright provocative. He angered China repeatedly with his actions and statements, beginning with his protocol-breaking phone call with the president of Taiwan. He disparaged NATO, the United Nations, the European Union, and German chancellor Angela Merkel in interviews and Twitter messages. And on Twitter, he wrote that he believed the United States should start stockpiling nuclear weapons again—a position all the more surprising given his admiring comments about Russian president Vladimir Putin and expressed desire to build better relations with Russia. “Mr. Trump’s unpredictability is perhaps his most predictable characteristic,” the New York Times concluded a few days before his inauguration.

Should we cultivate unpredictability?

We don’t know whether Trump’s unpredictable moves in the realm of foreign policy are impulsive or deliberately aimed at disarming his perceived adversaries. But the renewed discussion of the madman theory in the media and Trump’s provocative moves raise the question of whether calculated unpredictability is a winning strategy in negotiation.

In a 2013 study led by Professor Marwan Sinaceur of INSEAD in France, participants made greater concessions to counterparts who varied their emotional expressions over the course of a negotiation simulation—from cooperation to anger, for example—than to partners who seemed more emotionally consistent. The researchers concluded that trying to appear unpredictable can be an effective strategy in one-shot or short-term negotiations, particularly when you don’t expect to do business with that person again. Intimidating and even frightening displays can, indeed, motivate others to back down and give you what you want.

Yet for many negotiators, displaying false emotions or giving an inaccurate impression of their mental state, like other forms of deception, would violate their personal code of ethics. Moreover, unpredictability is likely to backfire in long-term negotiations and partnerships for several reasons. First, your efforts to repeatedly catch your counterpart off-guard could leave her feeling so irritated by your games that she retaliates or replaces you with a more consistent counterpart. Second, your reputation for unpredictability could spread throughout your network and leave you lacking desirable negotiating partners. Third, if people feel threatened by your outrageous claims or behavior, they could reciprocate with unstable and potentially damaging behavior of their own.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, unpredictability is a very narrow tool that requires us to sacrifice a much broader array of strategies that form the bedrock of effective mutual-gains negotiation, including trust building, information sharing, and joint value creation. Any short-term benefits a negotiator might gain from surprise and intimidation are likely to eventually be dwarfed by the long-term costs of alienating partners and walling oneself off from more collaborative approaches.

Resolving Conflicts Over Deeply Held Values

When our most precious beliefs and principles are at stake, unique strategies may be needed to bring us to agreement.

Astronomers consider Mauna Kea, a dormant volcano that rises more than two miles above the Pacific Ocean on the island of Hawaii, to be the premier site in the world for viewing the night sky. Due to the volcano’s high altitude and tranquil, dark nights, NASA and groups of scientists from around the globe began planting mega-telescopes on its bald, pristine terrain
in the 1970s.

In the shadow of the telescopes, Hawaiians bring offerings to Mauna Kea’s ancient burial sites. Some say that, surrounded by the stars, they feel closer to their ancestors there. Many Hawaiians view the gigantic telescopes as eyesores—and, worse, as a violation of their sacred land.

In 1999, U.S., Canadian, Indian, and Japanese astronomers began planning a mammoth $1.4 billion, 18-story telescope they hoped to build on Mauna Kea. Expected to provide new glimpses of the universe, it would be the largest telescope in the Northern Hemisphere and the biggest building on the island of Hawaii. Expecting objections from locals, the astronomers took steps to address them. First, they decided to position the so-called Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT) on a plateau below Mauna Kea’s summit, rather than atop it. They also promised to pay up to $5 million annually to care for the mountain and to fund education, development, and astronomy projects in Hawaii, the New York Times reports.

But although many Hawaiians welcomed the Thirty Meter Telescope’s predicted economic and scientific benefits, others categorically refused to condone another huge telescope on their sacred land. In 2014, protestors disrupted the telescope’s groundbreaking ceremony and formed a blockade that halted construction. Later that year, the Hawaiian Supreme Court revoked the telescope’s building permit, saying the project had to win approval at a scheduled hearing first.

With the fate of the telescope uncertain, the astronomers have developed a backup plan, saying they will build it on the Canary Islands if their legal challenges in Hawaii fail.

As the Mauna Kea conflict illustrates, some of our most heated negotiations and disputes concern our core values, such as our personal moral standards, our religious and political beliefs, and our family’s welfare. Business partners sometimes clash over the ethical standards they expect each other to uphold. A negotiator may refuse to do business with a potential counterpart she deems unsavory on moral grounds. And parents might bar their teenager from attending an event they think might be dangerous. When our most deeply held beliefs and principles are at stake, we might ratchet up conflict out of a desire to be heard or categorically refuse to negotiate. Research shows that such so-called value conflicts, which highlight our norms, beliefs, and identities, are more difficult to resolve than resource conflicts—those in which parties are fighting over shares of limited resources. We may feel so strongly and deeply about our values that we often refuse to make any concession that would appear to compromise them. A targeted approach may be needed to resolve conflicts over values. Drawing on new research, we present four strategies for negotiating such conflicts.

1. Assess whether the value is truly sacred.

Conflicts over values often arise because one or more of the parties involved considers a value to be sacred and nonnegotiable. “One of the challenges that we have is that, when you use the word sacred, it means no discussion,” said Peter Apo, a trustee of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, a state agency, in an interview with PBS NewsHour about the Thirty Meter Telescope dispute. “So, [the protestors] won’t come to the table to discuss anything, because there will be no compromise. The TMT will not be built. So that makes it a little bit difficult to talk about anything.”

In some cases, our values truly are sacred and not open to compromise. In other situations, however, our values turn out to be “pseudo-sacred”—that is, we are willing to negotiate them under certain conditions, notes Harvard Business School professor Max H. Bazerman. For example, in one study, negotiators with little power (namely, those with a weak BATNA, or best alternative to a negotiated agreement) were more likely to compromise on a seemingly sacred issue than negotiators with greater power, Notre Dame University professor Ann E. Tenbrunsel and her colleagues found in their research. A lack of alternatives led the low-power negotiators to become more flexible on the “sacred” issue.

Before refusing to budge on an issue you deem sacred, try to envision an outcome that would allow you to abide by the spirit of your values even as you make concessions on the specifics. Similarly, if a counterpart insists a particular issue is sacred, you might make a proposal that honors his values while also bringing you closer to agreement.

This doesn’t mean putting price tags on your most cherished beliefs; rather, it means thinking creatively about how to meet your broader goals. Imagine, for example, that you are adamantly opposed to your sibling’s desire to sell some of the possessions of your late parents that you cherish. But what if you donated some or all of your share of the proceeds from the sale to a charity that your parents supported? You might come to believe that this solution honors your parents’ values even more than keeping their belongings.

2. Highlight the most efficient solution.

Whether resources or values are at stake, experienced negotiators know that they can achieve better outcomes by making tradeoffs across issues than by simply haggling individually over every issue on the table. For example, suppose you represent a community group that is in conflict with a business over potential deforestation of two parcels of land that the business owns. Your group values Parcel A for its greater species diversity relative to Parcel B. Thus, you should be willing to make more concessions on Parcel B to protect a greater swath of Parcel A.

Surprisingly, though, in value conflicts, negotiators tend to reject such logrolling in favor of across-the-board concessions on all the issues at stake, Peter Lucas Stöckli (Military Academy at ETH Zurich) and Carmen Tanner (University of Zurich) found in their research. For example, you might prefer to make similar-sized cuts to both Parcel A and Parcel B than to sacrifice B to protect A. When one of our core values is at stake, we seem to be reluctant to engage in the kind of logrolling that would best advance our interests. We may find across-the-board cuts more satisfying because they don’t require us to make sacrifices across our values, Stöckli and Tanner theorize.

If your counterpart is resisting making tradeoffs across issues, this finding suggests, encourage her to see why such a deal would be more advantageous to her than similarly sized concessions across all issues. If she still resists the best objective outcome for her (and you), you might decide to accept a less efficient agreement in return for the potentially larger goals of ending the conflict and improving your relationship. And when we find ourselves resisting difficult tradeoffs, we need to consider whether we’re at risk of passing up the best solution for one that simply “feels” better.

3. Offer a concession on one of your core values.

You may also may be able to induce cooperation from a reluctant counterpart in a value conflict by making a difficult but symbolic concession on one of your own key principles or beliefs.

In a 2007 study, Jeremy Ginges of the New School for Social Research and his team presented various proposals for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to citizens residing in the West Bank and Gaza: Jewish-Israeli settlers, Palestinian refugees, and Palestinian student supporters of Hamas. All three groups soundly rejected proposals that would require their group to make a concession on a core issue (such as Israeli withdrawal from the regions or Palestinian forfeiture of the right of return to Israel) in exchange for peace. And when each side was also offered significant economic aid, they were repulsed by the idea of trading their sacred values for cash.

However, when asked whether they would accept the peace deal if it was accompanied by a significant concession from the opposing side on one of its sacred values, all three groups became willing to negotiate. The Israeli settlers agreed to make concessions if Hamas accepted Israel’s right to exist. The Palestinian refugees grew more flexible if Israelis would relinquish their claim to the West Bank. And the Palestinian students became ready to bargain if the Israelis were willing to officially apologize for Palestinian suffering in the conflict.

The results suggest why the protestors in Hawaii rejected the astronomers’ offer of significant funds to support local projects. When our most sacred values are at stake, we are likely to be offended by the suggestion that our support can be “bought.” By contrast, proposing a meaningful sacrifice on one of your own core values may demonstrate your seriousness and inspire reciprocation.

4. Affirm the other side’s positive qualities.

In a new study, researchers Fieke Harinck of Leiden University in the Netherlands and Daniel Druckman of George Mason University compared the effectiveness of particular interventions aimed at resolving both value conflicts and conflicts over resources. They paired off participants and had them attempt to negotiate a resolution to a resource conflict that either did or did not involve a core value.

Before negotiating, the participants were assigned to either a control condition or one of three intervention conditions. Those in the “other affirmation” condition were asked to list five positive qualities of their counterpart, such as an impression or a behavior they’d observed. Participants in the “shared identity” condition were asked to focus on traits they had in common with their counterpart. Participants in the “transaction costs” condition learned before negotiating that they would lose more money the longer they negotiated, thus creating a financial incentive to reach agreement quickly.

Which interventions worked best? For value conflicts, thinking about a counterpart’s positive qualities was most effective at maximizing the parties’ joint outcomes. Focusing on shared identity was marginally less effective than no intervention at all, and concentrating on transaction costs was least effective in value conflicts. Interestingly, affirming one’s counterpart was the least successful strategy in straightforward resource conflicts (those not involving a core value). Thus, in a value conflict, it may be wise to think about the qualities you appreciate in your counterpart, such as ingenuity, trustworthiness, deep convictions, or some other virtue.

This result dovetails with findings from University of California at Los Angeles professor Corinne Bendersky showing that negotiators may be able to soften their counterpart’s firm stance on a seemingly sacred value by making statements that affirm the counterpart’s status. In one of Bendersky’s experiments, participants who either strongly supported or opposed the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) were told they were being paired with a counterpart with polar-opposite views on the act. When participants received messages from their counterpart that affirmed their status—for example, “I have a lot of respect for people like you who stand by their principles”—they were more generous toward the counterpart in a subsequent decision-making task. It seems that an opponent’s affirmation of our status buffers us against the identity threat we’d suffer if we compromised on a core issue and makes us more flexible in the process.

Knowing when to admit defeat

Because we tend to err on the side of refusing to negotiate when our core values are at stake, it’s important to approach conflicts over values analytically rather than simply relying on our emotions and intuition, writes Program on Negotiation chair Robert Mnookin in his book Bargaining with the Devil: When to Negotiate, When to Fight (Simon & Schuster, 2010). But at the end of that self- or other analysis, we need to recognize when a value truly is sacred, and no amount of creative thinking or framing will persuade you or your counterpart to budge. As in all types of negotiations, it’s important to develop a strong BATNA in value conflicts so that you will be ready to walk away and honor your own and others’ deepest principles and beliefs if the need arises.

Mediation Used in Dispute Resolution Over Art Museums

Mediation Used in Dispute Resolution Over Art Museums

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes like mediation were used to save two museums

Don’t let Overconfidence Ruin your Potential Negotiated Agreement

When partners are negotiating a new business deal, overconfidence can lead them to overlook the possibility that the business will fail or otherwise struggle. Wise negotiators envision not only the best-case scenario, but the worst-case scenario, and prepare for it before signing on the dotted line.

In 2014, two art museums were at the center of disputes involving their host cities, Detroit, Michigan, and North Miami, Florida. In both cases, the question of who owns the museums’ collections and the museums themselves were at stake. Also in both cases, the interested parties have turned to mediation to break the impasse.

Beginning in Detroit, the city’s bankruptcy put the world-class collection of its art museum, the Detroit Institute of Arts (DIA), in jeopardy. Though the DIA is operated by a nonprofit organization, its valuable collection is owned by the city, a fact that put it in jeopardy.

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Negotiations in Detroit for Cultural Assets

Some Detroit creditors argued that part of the collection should be sold off to help address the city’s $18 billion in pension and other liabilities, wrote the New York Times. But local leaders and museum officials rejected this idea, arguing it would be short-sighted and demoralizing for a city that is attempting to rebuild itself after a devastating fall.

Auction house Christie’s appraised a portion of the museum’s masterpieces at $867 million. The DIA agreed earlier in 2014 in federal bankruptcy court mediation sessions to raise $100 million to help head off a possible auctioning of its assets. On June 9, the DIA announced that the Big Three U.S. automakers—Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler—had agreed to donate a combined $26 million to the pot. (Of course, in 2009, GM and Chrysler themselves emerged from bankruptcy thanks in large part to billions of dollars in federal assistance.)

With private donors and Michigan Legislature together raining over $800 million to save the collection from sale and to lessen pension cuts for Detroit retirees, the DIA was on a path toward greater security. As part of the bankruptcy deal reached in mediation, ownership of the art collection would be transferred from the city to the nonprofit that operates the museum to protect it from any future turmoil suffered by Detroit. The plan would still need to overcome opposition from creditors and must be voted on by the city’s 20,000 retirees.

Further south, in North Miami, the much smaller but prestigious Museum of Contemporary Art (MoCA) was also embroiled in a dispute over its future and management. The museum’s board is attempting to move the museum out of the working-class city and merge with “its wealthier and more glamorous neighbor,” the Bass Museum of Art in Miami Beach, writes Patricia Cohen in the Times. North Miami officials were trying to block the plan.

The city established MoCA as a nonprofit corporation in 1996 and founded a board of trustees to operate the museum. The negotiated agreement between the city and the board states that the “board shall own, protect and manage the permanent MoCA collection of art,” the Times writes. But the city argues that board only holds the collection on behalf of the public. “The collection belongs to the city, and they are trying to steal it,” North Miami Mayor Lucie Tondreau said.

Board members argued that MoCA had long outgrown its 12,000-foot gallery space. In 2012, North Miami voters rejected a $15 million municipal bond proposal to finance an expansion. Afterwards, board members began negotiating a merger with the Bass Museum.

That’s when the dispute between North Miami and the board escalated. The board sued to terminate the museum’s 10-year contract with North Miami on the grounds that the city had neglected MoCA. In response, the City Council revoked the board’s power to appoint and remove museum trustees and appointed its own interim director, even as the board-appointed director retains an office in the museum.

A county judge ordered the city and museum to start a mediation process regarding the museum’s future. The battle put MoCA exhibitions and programs in limbo. In November 2014, the dispute was settled with most of the works remaining in Miami, which was considered a win for the city.

The debates over the fate of these two museums suggest, in part, the need for business negotiators to carefully think through the range of future outcomes when hammering out an initial contract. In both cases, the question of who owned the museums’ collections became an issue as a result of fiscal difficulties in their host cities.

Related Article: Using Negotiation to Resolve a Conflict – How negotiations can help resolve the most intractable disputes.

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Build powerful negotiation skills and become a better dealmaker and leader. Download our FREE special report, Negotiation Skills: Negotiation Strategies and Negotiation Techniques to Help You Become a Better Negotiator, from the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School.


Originally posted in 2014 and updated regularly.